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Tajikistan's President Emmomali Rahmon gave this statement in 2006 on the occasion of making public his decision to ban state employees from having gold prosthetic teeth (dandoni tiloi). Such dentures, popular until recently among many sections of Tajikistan' society, represented, for President Rahmon, the tendency of modern day Tajiks to display a 'lack of culture'. 2 The gold teeth, the President argued, 'mis-represented' Tajikistan to foreign publics, and this stood in the way of his attempts to attract much-needed foreign investment and aid. Since the late 1990s, the general aims of Tajikistan's foreign policy have largely been the promotion of a 'positive perception of Tajikistan abroad' using 'all available controls' (Zarifi 2009:6) . The way in which Tajikistan is perceived internationally is indeed not a small issue for Tajikistan: a country with a multivectorial and economic-oriented foreign policy that hinges strongly on humanitarian aid (Kunchins et.al. 2015) . 3 In 2016 for example Swizerland reportedly invested 15 million US dollars each year in the form of support for development programmes in Tajikistan (Swiss Cooperation Office 2006) . As a result, the government prohibition of gold teeth points toward the emphasis that the country's 1 Reported by Sarkorova (2006) in BBC Russian. 2 Gold-teeth were very popular among certain sectors of the population in the Soviet Union especially in the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus (c.f. Vatulescu 2010) . 3 Between 1996 and 1998 humanitarian aid to Tajikistan constituted approximately 58% of Tajikistan's GDP (Nakaya 2009 ). Today, one of the main vectors of Tajikistan's diplomacy is attracting foreign investment to local infraestructure, mining and energy projects (Kunchins et.al. 2015) .
government places on the need for Tajik citizens to demonstrate a positive image of Tajikistan's culture abroad.
Subsequent to the prohibition, the popularity of gold teeth in Tajikistan indeed declined. For example, Khola Zarnigor, a Dushanbe-based seamstress who has travelled on a number of occassions to Iran for medical treatment, told me in 2010 that she replaced her gold teeth for white-porcelain teeth. She remarked, however, that she had not made the change as a direct result of the presidential decrees. Khola Zarnigor told me, rather, that having arrived in
Teheran she felt embarrased when talking to Iranian women because she noticed that none of the Muslim women with whom she interacted in the city had gold teeth. Most of all, she said, she wanted to look 'modern' and 'Muslim' in the manner that her 'sisters' in Teheran appeared. Bobo Bobojor, a man who was formerly a factory-worker, and, now in his 70s, lives in a village near Kulob, went one step further: he had his gold teeth extracted, and told me that he preferred to remain toothless (bedandon). Bobo Bobojor, told me that all kind of prosthetics constitute an alteration to one's body and are therefore a sin (gunoh) according to Islamic teachings. These cases illustrate some of the ways in which the government project of banning gold teeth on its citizens has conflicting and unintended effects: while my informants emphasise their attempts to use their bodies in a manner that helps them to become devout Muslims who are also representatives of the Tajik nation, the government, by contrast, seeks to fashion them simply as the incarnation of a national, modern and secular Tajikistan. In this article I examine how this type of instances concerning the assemblages of dress and bodies are important sites of diplomacy, or the processes to which I refer to as 'embodied diplomacy'.
First, 'embodied diplomacy' refers to the multifaceted ways in which the brand-image of acted in a way that conformed with existing dress-codes, and argued that the reason they followed such decress resulted from their loyalty to their nation (vatan), as well as their desire for national unity (vahdat) and for a positive image of Tajikistan and its people circulating in the world. 5 However, in the processes of assembling their dress-styles, I came to recognise the ways in which Tajiks also fashion themselves as persons whose individual and communal identities and subjectivities superseed the homogenised and essensialised elements that are deemed permissible within the frames of the official brand-image. Such contestation is not talked about by my interlocutours as dissent or political resistance.
Neverthless, the everyday practices through which they rework mandatory dress-codes often produce conflicting effects in the official brand-image envisioned as embracing Tajikistan's national identity and foreign policy ambitions by government officials.
'Islamic products' in Dushanbe also include other items that are marketed as being geographically and affectively connected to the 'sacred centres of Islam'. 5 The ethnographic data in this article was gathered in 16 months of fieldwork conducted in a neighborhood of Soviet-style apartment blocks in Kulob city, southern Tajikistan, as well as Dushanbe (2009 Dushanbe ( -2015 , and the city Yiwu in China (2016 sheds light on the 'role of materiality and affect in producing our geopolitical world.' (Dittmer 2015b:605) .
Assemblages: dress, bodies and diplomacy
In the article I take dress to be an 'assemblage of body modifications and/or supplements'
(Roach-Higgings and Eicher 1992: 2); dress-code the obligatory clothes, body modifications and supplements decreed by Tajikistan's government, and dress-style the fashions that people incorporate to their everyday apparel. Fashion, as Heath (1992) In his study of the nineteenth century British Foreign Office, Dittmer suggests that the openended and ever-changing nature of assemblages involving human and non-human entities 'troubles the usual scalar imagination of diplomacy and international relations, in which bigger entities are assumed to be more important.' (2015a:10) Dittmer argues that not only do state-actors and their rational choices shape policy and statecraft: objects, materials and affects are also implicated in the fashioning of political subjectivities. By paying attention to apparently insignificant objects (e.g. cables, wires and paper) and the historically-grounded relations they form, it is possible, he suggests, to conceive of 'a range of diplomatic actors that may not qualify as states', and having done so 'it becomes possible to see multiple scales emerging simultaneously through the processes of diplomatic assemblage.' (Dittmer 2015a) .
Through my consideration of Tajikistan 
Tajik nation-brand and dress
Dress and fashion, and the images they convey are not politically neutral (Lemire 2010; Lindisfarne-Tapper and Ingham 1997) . Accordingly, the significance of dress and the body to representations of 'tradition' has been present in political debates and practical attempts to While a detailed historical analysis of dress in relationship to national identity is beyond the scope of the ethnographic material presented in this article, it is important to highlight that the significance of dress-codes to the construction of ethnic and national identities is far from something that is novel or unique to independent Tajikistan. Cultural policies regarding dress have been central to the endeavours of many states that have achieved independence in the 20 th century and sought to build and endorse 'national cultures' based on specific notions of tradition and modernity (e.g. Allman 2004 (ed.), Baker 2000 , Parkins 2002 , Tarlo 1996 . In comparable terms, dress and above all female Tajik national dress, has remained at the core of Tajikistan's government's cultural policy for decades, especially since the advent of independence that followed the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
In Tajikistan the necessity of building and promoting national unity (vahdati millí) among its peoples in order to overcome the divisions caused by the civil war (1992-1997) has been much-emphasised in public discourse (Roche 2014) . After the war, nationalism and statecraft has focused on an image of peaceful state-building, the uniqueness of Tajik identity, and the figure of the President as the country's exceptional and supreme leader (Heathershaw 2009 ). According to Jonson (2006) , the nationalist project goes beyond Tajikistan's policies within its territorial borders. Jonson argues that the current government connects Tajikistan's foreign policy to the country's official history by stressing its previous historic status as the Samanid Empire. The figure of Ismail Somoni, the emir of Transoxania and Khorasan who belonged to this dynasty, has become the historical and 'symbolic core' around which the contemporary Tajik nation has been formed (Dodkhudoeva et.al. 2013:287) . This narrative permits the government to locate Tajikistan regionally and internationally not as a 'small' actor, but as one that has inherited a 'high culture' and therefore plays an influential role in regional and world affairs whilst restoring itself to its former imperial magnitude (Jonson 2006 , Dodkhudoeva et.al. 2013 ).
The principles underpinning strictly censored notions of national identity and dress-codes have also incorporated the production of official historical narratives that emphasise elements of the Aryan, Tajik 
Gendered and Senescent Bodies: Tradition and Modernity
The great majority of women in Kulob agree that Tajik women must wear exclusively the Tajik national dress (kurtai tojikí) on a daily basis. In contrast, many women in Dushanbe combine the national dress with a style that is called 'modern' (Rus. sovremeeniy; Taj. zamonavi); that is, Western-style trousers and shirts or suits. Kurtai tojiki consists of a baggy gown that falls loosely to the ankles over loose trousers. The gown is pleated and attached to a semi-circular or angular collar which leaves the neck and part of the chest exposed. Most women don a namol or a headscarf which only partially covers their hair and is knotted at the back of the neck. The most common textiles used in making these dresses are cotton (pakhta) and velvet (pambal or bakhmal), and are generally sewed by women themselves at home or tailored by local seamstresses. At first glance, it might appear that the dress-code for women in Tajikistan is homogeneous, especially in a provincial city such as Kulob where female forms of 'modern' clothing are almost entirely absent. However, although portrayed as a timeless, authentic and unchanging 'tradition' (sunnat), the Tajik dress is constantly being transformed through the incorporation of new fashions that take the form of textiles, colours, decorations and styles. Most, if not all, my female interlocutors told me that they try to update their kurtai tojiki every year according to the seasons (winter and summer), and following incoming fashion. In addition, such styles vary according to the specificities of the female bodies they adorn; elderly women, for example, wear a different and wider type of sleeve than younger women, and are also allowed by government officials to wear a long veil similar to hijab but which is generally white.
If women are central to official representations of the Tajik nation, authenticity and tradition, there is a male counterpart that is not only gendered, but also inflected by local understandings of masculinity, ageing and senescence. In contrast to the national Tajik dress for women, men are usually said to wear 'modern' clothes. Starting from their first year in school, boys wear Western-style suits, a tie stamped with Tajikistan's national emblem, and black formal shoes; this is also what state employees wear to work. Alternatively, young men wear jeans, tracksuit bottoms, T-shirts and formal or athletic shoes after lessons or having returned home from work. In contrast, the male elders (piru) or 'grandfathers' (boboho) are expected, as are women, to wear 'traditional' outfits. As is the case for elderly women (kampir) or 'grandmothers' (moma) (who don a special type of veil after having reached a certain age when they are considered to be elderly), 'grandfathers' distinguish themselves from younger men by making critical changes to their everyday dress. In most parts of Tajikistan, 'grandfathers' continue to wear the Western-style shirts and chino trousers they had previously worn in their youth, but they often exchange their shoes for kalush (a special type of boots composed of thick leather-socks (jurob) and a pointy black shoe. The elderly tuck their trousers into the kalush and wear a joma or a hand-made padded coat. In addition, most 'grandfathers' leave their beards to grow long.
In this equation, the bodies and clothes of male youngsters and adults before reaching the 'age' of 'grandfathers' represent Tajikistan Seamstresses in Dushanbe and Kulob told me that during some seasons they copy certain motifs from Arabic, Iranian, Indian, Pakistani and Afghan clothes and adapt them to local aesthetics. Tajik women in their 50s reported to me that Indian-inspired dresses had been fashionable in the late 70s and the early 80s when the Soviet Union increased cultural and academic cooperation with India, and Indian films were often shown in local cinemas. In summer 2010, 'Indian' dresses again became a favourite type of clothing for many Tajik young women. These dresses could be purchased in Dushanbe's markets, to which they were mostly imported by Afghan traders (Marsden 2016) , and consisted of what in India is called kameez, chudari or punjabi (Osella and Osella 2007) . Although most Kulobi women to whom I spoke found them 'beautiful' (khushruí), they also said that the outfits were too expensive and inadequate to suit the requirements of local conventions of modesty (hoksori).
In contrast to the baggy, ankle-length national dress, they judged these Indian dresses to be excessively short (below the knee) and tight (tang). Countless men and women in Kulob despised this new 'Indian' fashion because they considered the gowns to be prone to revealing women's silhouettes, and to be 'open' (kushoda) because they 'expose' women's calves to public sight -notwithstanding that the gowns were worn above trousers made of the same fabric. Most importantly, a number of the opponents of this fashion argued, these dresses were 'foreign' (khorijí). Embarrassed by the scene and afraid of further reprimands, Surayo claimed that it was the seamstress to be blamed -she had made a mistake when taking the measurements and sewed the gown too short and tight. Her brothers were especially angry because they remarked to her that the dress meant that her 'plump buttocks' (kuni farbe) could be openly perceived by onlookers, and that, as a result, men (including their own neighbors -they emphasised)
would harass her with sexual remarks in the street. 'You are a Tajik, a Kulobi girl! You are not an Indian actress', one of Surayo's brothers said while laughing at her and imitating the movements of a Bollywood dance. Surayo's mother and brothers not only were worried about the tightness or Indian features of the dress, but also concerned about how it revealed the girl's body -which, they pointed out, was no longer a 'child's body'. Surayo told me afterwards that she felt sad and angry, and after so much criticism and mockery from her mother and brothers, she had lost any remaining desire to wear the dress in public. This was a different story from one of her classmates, she explained to me, whose body was so skinny and 'flat' (pachaq), that with the tightest of dresses, men would not look at or harass her: her parents allowed her to wear whatever she chose.
This example highlights the importance of differences that exist within each 'apparently natural gender category': 'different individuals who are ascribed membership of one gender category are by no means anatomically identical' (Lindisfarne-Tapper and Ingham 1997:19) .
The Indian-inspired dress seems to have been acceptable on Surayo's friend 'flat' (skinny) body, but not on Surayo's corpulent figure. It is in the interstices of this disjuncture that embodied diplomacy is revealed as an assemblage of dress, gendered, senescent and disparate bodies in the following ways. In her analysis of the dress-codes that young Kyrgyz women are expected to wear in Russia, Suyarkulova (2016) into which Surayo has unwillingly been turned (see also Morris this volume).
Finally, when Surayo argues that it is the seamstress to be blamed for the design, she is deploying her skills of mediation in order to defend her reputation, and of coercion in order to convince her family about her preferred dress-style. Indeed, although she was unsuccessful at wearing the Indian-inspired dress in a provincial town such as Kulob, Surayo's parents allowed her to wear the outfit when she visited her relatives in the capital city, Dushanbe.
During the visit, Surayo told me, her aunts admired her fashionable new dress, and positively commented that indeed, she looked 'like a Bollywood star'.
Five years after these events, I met Surayo again in Dushanbe and asked her about her Indian dress. Now 20 years old, Surayo was enrolled in a BA in Food Industry at a polytechnic institute. The Indian-inspired dresses, she told me with amusement, were now 'out of fashion'. What was important for her, she said, was to obtain a scholarship that would allow her to continue her studies in India. 'The Indian Embassy' Surayo told me, 'offers scholarships to Tajik students every year and some of my fellows have gone there. Can you imagine if they saw me with my old Indian dress? ' 8 We both laughed at her remark before commenting on how profoundly the fashion for Indian clothing, mockery she had received by her brothers, support from her aunts, and her own determination to be independent in the face of familial opposition years before had affected her ways of thinking about the world.
Nevertheless, Surayo concluded, if she went to India with a scholarship, she would wear a Tajik traditional dress. After all, she said, she was a Tajik girl (dukhtari Tojik): despite everything, Surayo continued to regard herself as the incarnation of the Tajik nation.
As I now explore not only style but also material has become a site of embodied diplomacy in
Tajikistan during the course of my fieldwork. The textiles used in the making of Tajik clothing are also the subject of official and family evaluations concerning Tajikistan's place in the world especially in relationships to Tajikistan's fraught yet increasingly significant relations with its powerful neighbour: China.
Chinese Lycra versus Tajik Cotton
As part of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) China has enlarged its presence in Tajikistan through trade, investment and assistance in the development of infrastructure (including projected railway lines, and a gas-pipe that is expected to use Tajikistan as a transit territory from neighbouring energy-rich countries) (Kunchins et.al. 2015) . This growing cooperation is commented upon by Tajikistan's residents with reference to the increasing volume of imports of Chinese goods to Tajikistan's markets, and the growing number of Chinese workers and professionals in the country.
In 2006, Tajikistan's government launched a campaign against Lycra-textiles, the majority of which had been imported from China. 9 Dresses made of Lycra, women in Kulob told me, became trendy (Rus. modnyy) in those years, but many women in Tajikistan were rapidly deterred from purchasing this elastic textile. On the one hand, they argued that the fabric was unsuitable for the hot temperatures in summer (in the low valleys can reach above forty degrees). This position was reinforced by government officials who, in their speeches in national TV, advertised Lycra as being the cause of skin problems such as irritation, dryness and even the development of ulcers. On the other hand, women argued that Lycra-dresses were very tight (tang) and revealed women's silhouettes. On the whole, Lycra-textiles contravened Tajikistan's proud history as a producer of high-quality cotton and cotton-made textiles, and bought vivid attention to the increasing dependency of on synthetic textiles made in China, and Chinese imports in general.
In 2009, Nasiba, a friend of mine from Kulob city who at the time was 17 years old, wore a Lycra-dress for me in her room. In a joking tone, she told me: 'I cannot go out from home wearing this. I look ugly. I became tangem Chinese' (tangem khitoy shidam). Tangem was the name given to a small, cheap and fragile style of mini-bus imported from China to Tajikistan that was banned by the government of Dushanbe in 2011 because of its unreliability. At times, tangem is a word used in Kulob region that refers to other goods made in China in a derogatory manner. Tangem-Chinese often indexes the low quality of such products especially when compared with textile of apparently higher quality made in Turkey or India. Regardless of the fact that many families in Kulob has scarce access to cash and many women described themselves as 'poor' (kambagal), Lycra-dresses came to be seen as unsophisticated by such women because of their association with other Chinese low-quality goods.
The government of Tajikistan attempts indeed to determine the Tajik 'national dresses' that women are expected to a very high level of detail. Black is an undesired colour as it is considered an imitation of the gowns worn by some women in Arab countries and Iran.
Hence, through his speeches in national TV, the President of Tajikistan often invites women to tailor their national dress in the bright and multi-coloured cotton-textiles made within the country. Cotton is so important to the brand-image of Tajikistan that the national emblem of the country contains cotton and wheat surrounded by banners of the national flag.
Unfortunately, the textiles produced in Tajikistan 
'Why do you want to be Russian?' -Blond dyed-hair
Together with teeth, dresses and textiles, hair is an aspect of the assemblage of dress that is of importance to my interlocutors in Kulob and Dushanbe, and that also informs the ways in which diplomacy is embodied in Tajikistan As is the case with other items of their daily dress and textiles, hair-dyes intersect with the ways in which Tajikistan's people interpret their national identity and their role as Tajikistan's representatives.
The conversations I had with women in Kulob about hair-dyes, and cosmetics more broadly, revolved around the popularity and aesthetic dimensions of such products, or the condemnation of these goods as damaging one's health as they have been industrially produced with chemicals. Some women went even further to comment to me that God (Khudo) did not permit people to alter the human body with cosmetics or hair-dyes insofar as the body (jism) was granted to them by God in a 'clean' (toza) and pure (pokiz) state.
11
Generally, however, most women agreed that the black-dye called usma, commonly used to dye hair or to shape a monobrow, was a permissible cosmetic because it was extracted from a plant (alaf) that, according to my interlocutors, 'only grows in Tajik soil'. 12 Therefore, usma was considered 'natural' (tabií), and the black colour it produced was evaluated as being embedded in notions authenticity.
Not only the 'natural' or 'artificial' qualities of the products used as hair-dyes mattered, but the exact nature of the colour they produced was also a topic of discussion. Synthetic blond tints, especially applied to women's hair, had a particularly negative connotation. Unsurprisingly, this method was ineffective at changing her hair colour dark, but at least, Sumiya told me, her father and brothers stopped bothering her. 'We do not want to appear
Russian' Sumiya told me, 'We wanted our hair blond simply because we find blond hair beautiful and trendy'. Sumiya and Maniya told me that they dyed their hair blond on the same day because by looking similar they wanted to emphasise their friendship (dusti) with one another. Indeed , friendship, care, and empathy for one another was often shown by women in Kulob by tailoring and wearing one's national dress in the same textile-pattern and colour as one's most beloved friend or relative -as Maniya and Sumiya also did at times. Hence, if Sumiya and Maniya were scolded for their 'immorality' or their 'Russian-like' appearance with their dyed blond-hair, the girls decided to pass through such criticism and problems together -as true friends must do. In such a case, their uniformity highlighted affection to one another rather than alliance with Russia. In Sumiya's and Maniya's case, however, the affection for one another entered in competition with the loyalty that they were expected to demonstrate towards their nation (vatan) because by 'looking Russian' they challenged the expected principles of Tajikistan's brand-image.
Conclusion
In 2011, Tajikistan's state officials passed a decree that makes it obligatory for Tajik pilgrims to wear a blue-sky uniform during their Hajj to Mecca and Medina. This uniform, they argued, helps Tajiks to recognise each other among the millions of pilgrims and thus to avoid going astray. Not only the blue-sky color of this outfit is noticeable, but the Tajik national flag is also embroidered on every item of the clothing -including the veil with which women cover their heads. According to Laylo, a Tajik 
